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Prepared by Jessica Poppele  (EACIQ), Sudarno Sumarto (SMERU) and Lant Pritchett (EACIF).
Summary.  The social impacts of Indonesia’s crisis, while serious, have fortunately
been less dramatic than early reports suggested.  Rather than the universal
devastation in poverty, employment, education  and health so widely predicted and
repeated in the media, new data reporting on conditions as of  the fall of 1998 reveal a
more complex and heterogeneous picture.  Not surprisingly, given the genesis of the
financial and economic crisis in the formal sector, people in urban areas hurting more
than rural areas.  People on Java appear to have been more effected and are bearing
the brunt of the crisis, both in comparison to more isolated islands with less linkage
to the formal, modern economy (Maluku) or islands with export commodities (large
parts of Sulawesi, Sumatra). The new data also show that pre-crisis economic status
or poverty rates are not good indicators of how much any given region or household
has been affected by the crisis.  While some of the poor are doing worse, others
appear to be better off and many of the newly emergent urban middle classes are hit
the worst of all.  There are however hard hit areas in Kalimantan and the Eastern
Islands which were both poor pre-crisis and which have been hit very hard by the
crisis.  These new data have important implications for policy makers in designing
and adjusting programs aimed at minimizing the affects of the crisis on the poor and
vulnerable.
*) This is not a World Bank report and has not received World Bank review nor
approval.  Circulation in this preliminary form is intended to disseminate the findings of
work in progress to encourage the exchange of ideas, even if the work is less than fully
polished.  The paper carries the names of the authors and should be cited accordingly.
The findings, interpretations, and conclusions expressed in this paper are entirely those
of the authors.  They do not necessarily represent the view of the World Bank, its
Executive Directors, or the countries they represent.  Similarly, these views do no
necessarily represent the views of those governments or organizations which provide
support to SMERU.
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Introduction
Expenditure changes and poverty impact.  This paper looks first at new data sources
on changes over the last year in expenditures and asset ownership and  asset sales as
proxies for income changes due to the crisis.  These data dispel the notion that half of
Indonesia’s population will slip below the poverty line (predictions which were
analytically unsound in any case).  Instead the new data show large falls in
expenditures, but that the falls have varied enormously between urban and rural,
across regions of Indonesia and across households between rich and poor.
Sectors. Next this paper discusses the three areas targeted by the government in its
social impact mitigation programs:
• employment creation and income maintenance,
• education, and
• health
Within these areas, this paper revisits the original forecasts -- the scope of the
problem as it had been understood -- in light of new data noting possible policy and
program design implications.  Comparison of the impacts between rich and poor,
urban and rural and across regions of Indonesia paints a more complex and varied
picture of crisis impacts across the archipelago.  There is a serious crisis to be
addressed, but addressing the crisis requires that the responses be tailored to the
actual dimensions and pattern of the crisis.
I. New data on the crisis
Because of the collaborative efforts of many individuals, government, donor agencies
and foundations interested in mitigating the social impacts of the crisis there are a
number of new sources of data which will tell us more about the crisis.  This note
relies principally on new data primarily from three sources, all of which are able to
compare outcomes in roughly August-September 1998 versus a year earlier.
• The Indonesian Family Life Survey (IFLS),an ongoing longitudinal household and
community survey, is a collaborative effort of RAND, Lembaga Demografi-UI, and
UCLA.  The IFLS results presented below are drawn from two publications:
                                          
1 This is not a World Bank report and has not received World Bank review nor approval.
Circulation in this preliminary form is intended to disseminate the findings of work in
progress to encourage the exchange of ideas, even if the work is less than fully polished.
The paper carries the names of the authors and should be cited accordingly.  The
findings, interpretations, and conclusions expressed in this paper are entirely those of the
authors.  They do not necessarily represent the view of the World Bank, its Executive
Directors, or the countries they represent.  Similarly, these views do no necessarily
represent the views of those governments or organizations which provide support to
SMERU.
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"Health, Family Planning and Well-being in Indonesia During an Economic Crisis"
by Frankenberg, Beegle, Sikoki, and Thomas (1998) and "Measuring Change in
Household Welfare During a Crisis: Early Results from the Indonesian Family Life
Surveys," by Beegle, Frankenberg, and Thomas (1999). Both are available from
RAND, Santa Monica at <website address>.  The papers are based on data that
were collected in Aug-Dec, 1997, (as part of IFLS2) and Aug-Dec, 1998 (as part of
IFLS2+) with funding from NIH, USAID, The World Bank, WHO, and UNFPA.
• The “100 Villages” Survey, sponsored by UNICEF and carried out by BPS (Central
Bureau of  Statistics),  gives data from re-interviewing households in August 1998
that were previously surveyed in July 1997; and
• The Kecamatan  Crisis Impact  Survey, a qualitative survey of expert respondents
from each of the roughly 4,000 kecamatan (sub-districts) in the country financed
by Ford foundation and ASEM and carried out by BPS.
Where relevant these sources are compared with information from the government's
period national expenditure survey, the National Socio-Economic Survey (SUSENAS)
which was carried out in February 1998.
The timing of the surveys is important, as the crisis has played out in several stages.
Essentially the crisis did not begin until August of 1997 when the exchange rate was
first floated.  Things deteriorated steadily, followed by an enormous crash in the
exchange rate in January of 1998, after which things stabilized somewhat, only to be
followed by the political crisis of May after which the exchange rate and stock market
deteriorated again and prices continued to rise rapidly.  Finally, there was a rapid
run-up of the price of rice just before and during the period of independence day
(August 17th).  After September of 1998 the macroeconomic aggregates have stabilized,
again, with rice prices declining from their late August peaks, consumer price
inflation slowing to almost nothing and the exchange rate remaining fairly stable.
This timing implies several things about the data.  First,  the data is well timed
capturing pre-crisis to post crisis (temporary) nadir.  Second, the data may well have
been influenced by the sharp temporary spike in rice prices (the price of medium
quality rice in Jakarta rose from 2500 Rp/kg at the beginning of August to 3500 by
first week of September, but then fell back to less that 3000 by the first week of
October).  Third,  while the “crisis” was a year old in August 1998 as a financial crisis
it is almost certain that many of the “real” effects are only beginning to be seen has
firms and households respond to the changes.  So the evolution of the social impacts
will likely trace out a more delayed and lagged response relative to a quickly moving
financial indicator like the exchange rate.
The IFLS2+ is a resurvey of almost 2,000 households in seven provinces that were
part of the broader IFLS project.  The seven provinces were purposively selected so
that they span the full spectrum of socio-economic status and economic activity
under the fuller IFLS sample which were representative of about 83 percent of
Indonesia’s population.
The household-level data collected in both IFLS2 and IFLS2+ include expenditures,
assets, income and details of current work status of each household member;
education enrollments, expenditures and school attendance; use of health care and
family planning including prices and choice of provider; indicators of health status
(both self-reported and measured by a trained health worker); migration; transfers
among family members and transfers to and from community programs including
such programs as the Padat Karya, school scholarship programs and the Kartu Sehat.
Extensive data on prices, service availability and quality are collected at the
community level, both from knowledgeable informants and through visits to schools
and health facilities.
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In contrast with the 100 Villages survey (below), the IFLS follows households and
individuals who move from the location where they were interviewed in earlier rounds.
IFLS2+ re-interviewed over 98% of the households (and over 96% of the individuals)
that were interviewed in 1997.  Sample attrition is not a serious concern in the IFLS
2+ data.
As noted by the authors of the IFLS publications that we are drawing from, all results
are very preliminary and subject to change as the data and tabulations are still being
verified and revised.  Also None of the results are weighted to take account of
purposive sampling differences. For more detail, and additional results, please see the
IFLS publications cited above.
100 Villages.  The 100 villages survey re-surveyed 120 people in each of 100 villages
in 1998.  The 100 villages are not statistically representative of the country, but were
chosen as “representative” of various parts of the country.  The data cover only 10 of
the country’s over 300 kabupaten.  In the 1998 sample 80 households from the 120
interviewed in 1997 were re-interviewed while 40 new HH were selected and added to
keep the sample size at 1202.  Here we use comparisons of village averages only.  The
data include information on expenditures, asset ownership, education enrollment,
health status, and other indicators.  The survey is part of a larger exercise that means
to integrate quantitative and qualitative indicators tracked over time to provide a more
dynamic and integrated picture of poverty.
The results reported are from the preliminary tabulations of the BPS and analysis by
UNICEF of the data in a draft titled “Rapid Appraisal” dated 12/4/98.
The nationwide Kecamatan  Crisis Impact Survey was a subjective, expert respondent survey of
three government officials in each of Indonesia’s 4025 kecamatans.  In each sub-district three
respondents with kecamatan-wide responsibilities were chosen and asked a standard set of questions
about changes taking place in the kecamatan.   The questions asked about the degree of different kinds of
impacts (migration, access to health and education, food availability, etc.), the frequency of different
types of coping strategies, and the most severe impacts in each area.  All questions were designed to
measure proportional change in indicators relative to the same time in 1997, to eliminate seasonal
changes.
National coverage was necessary in order to identify crisis-hit areas for program
targeting.  By asking for qualitative assessments the survey designers hoped to get
universal coverage with complete response (the use of quantitative questions did
dramatically raise the non-response rate in this survey). Using expert respondents
eliminated the problem of large unmanageable sample sizes and allowed for rapid
response, but raised the concern of  inter-respondent reliability.  Simply put, would
two people who were asked the same question about the same kecamatan tend to give
the same answer? Three cross-referencing approaches showed an acceptable degree of
consistency in response patterns within kecamatan but also showed significant level
of disagreement between respondents.  This and other limitations imply that, while
the broad patterns -- at the provincial and district level -- indicated by this data are
useful in targeting of crisis response, used on their own, these data would be
insufficient to target programs at the kecamatan level.
                                          
2 Unfortunately when one of the HH chosen for re-interviewing was not available (because
they had moved or the HH has broken up) a new HH was chosen randomly from the 40
previously not selected from the previous year’s HH and added to the “re-interview” group.
This means that the sample in 1998 suffers from attrition bias as the 80 re-interviewed
HH are no a random sample, but are a sample of those who could be re-interviewed.
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The tables and graphs are taken from a document, "The Social Impact of the Crisis In
Indonesia:  Results From a Nationwide Kecamatan Survey", December, 1998 draft.
The SUSENAS, which contains a core, but short consumption schedule, is carried out
every year.  Once every three years, the survey contains a separate and detailed
consumption module, and this is the one used for poverty estimation.  The last year
for which such detailed poverty statistics are available is 1996.  The next official
estimates are due based on data collected in February 1999 with poverty estimates
based on an accelerated processing of a sub-sample of 10,000 available by June.
II. The impact of the crisis on expenditures, assets, and poverty
A. Forecasts
To date the government and various international agencies have predicted extreme
and nation-wide impacts from the crisis.  As expectations worsened from January
1998 through the chaos of May and into June people were caught up in a vicious
cycle of doom saying in which the only news could be that the news was even worse.
The estimated level of absolute poverty prior to the crisis was around 11 percent,
since the population is near 200 million, around 22 million people3.  In February
initial estimates by the World Bank were that poverty would increase to around 17
percent, or 34 million people.  Then others suggested poverty would reach 50 million
people.  In June The BPS reported that the percentage of people living below the
poverty line in mid-1998 was around 40 percent or about 80 million people: an
increase in the poverty rate of almost 30 percentage points in a year!  Not to be
outdone, more recently, the figure has been inflated in one report estimating that by
the end of 1998, almost half the population, or 100 million Indonesians would be
living below the poverty line.
The higher figures of 40 percent of the population in poverty produced by BPS and
repeated by others (e.g. ILO) were known as soon as they were published to be
analytically unsound.  It was premised on a confusion of real and nominal incomes
(which implied real income losses on the order of 80-90 percent).  It was based on the
unrealistic assumption that in 1998 people’s nominal incomes would remain fixed
while prices increased by 80 percent.4
Getting some sense of the increase in poverty is important for policymaking as if it
really were the case that half the Indonesian population were in absolute poverty then
this calls for massive, universal programs and very little attention to targeting, either
regionally or by household.  Just by simple arithmetic, if half the population were
poor the a rupiah’s worth of benefits distributed uniformly would be received by a
poor household half the time.  This is about as good a ratio of total cost to benefits
received by the poor as any targeted program achieves.
                                          
3 This was of course based on a very strict definition of absolute poverty and obviously a
higher level of expenditures to define the poverty line would have produced a greater
number of people in poverty.  However, no serious scholar disputes that whatever the line,
there had been enormous progress in poverty reduction from the mid 1970s to the mid
1990s.  Moreover, in discussing poverty increases one needs to use a consistent definition
for “before” and “after.”
4 While the BPS has subsequently changed its methodology, this is layed out most clearly in
Annex A to the ILO's June 1998 report "Employment Challenges Of the Indonesian
Economic Crisis".  The assumption that prices would rise 80 percent while nominal
incomes were on average unchanged, assumes an economy of all buyers and no sellers.
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The new data suggest that the dire forecasts are wrong, and by a lot, not a little, for
three reasons.  First,  the typical magnitude of the decline in expenditures is not any
where near as large as the 80 percent fall in real income implied by the combination
of 80 percent inflation and stagnant nominal incomes.  Second, the crisis has tended
to hit urban areas, which has higher incomes and hence a given income shock has
less influence on poverty rates.  Third,  there is some evidence the crisis has hit more
affluent individuals proportionately harder than the absolute poor.
As with any important and complex issue, while it is easy to point out what is false,
the truth is more subtle.  While Indonesia is suffering a severe crisis, it is not the
universal disaster that some would have it.  There are large differences in how the
crisis has effected urban and rural areas, in how it has effected different regions and
how it has effected the rich and poor.
B. The Urban Crisis
Overall, the crisis has a strong urban bias where the depreciated rupiah, corporate
debt, illiquid banks, exorbitant interest rates, exit of foreign investment and lack of
trade finance, have to a large extent paralyzed the formal economy.
IFLS 2+.  The preliminary data from the IFLS 2+ household survey in seven provinces shows that
average per capita household expenditure had decreased by 24 percent (Table 1).
The average spending in urban areas fell by a shocking 34 percent with the median falling by 5 percent.
In contrast, rural expenditures fell by much less, in both mean and median,  have risen,
with mean expenditure falling 13 percent but median expenditures falling by only 1.6
percent.
Table 1:  Household Per Capita Expenditures:  1997, 1998 & Changes
real (1997) rupiahs per month (‘000)
Mean Change in 1998 Percent Change
1997 Mean Median Mean Median
Urban 319 -108 -7 -33.9% -5.0%
Rural 194 -26 -2 -13.4% -1.6%
All respondents 246 -60 -2 -24.4% -1.5%
Source: IFLS2+, Table 2.1
We should raise here, in the first time we use the expenditures data that there is the
very serious problem of the use of expenditure data as a proxy for incomes.  It has
become standard practice to use consumption expenditures as a proxy for incomes for
reasons both practical and theoretical.  Practically, it is just impossible to measure
incomes.  Theoretically, one can make the argument that since households will use
saving and borrowing to smooth expenditures over time that expenditures measured
over a short period is a better proxy for a household’s long-run income and economic
status than is measured income.
However, this same reason suggests that expenditure changes should be used only
with great caution as an indicator for changes in welfare or income shocks due to the
crisis.  Someone very near “subsistence” level income may well sell assets or work
more or undertake any expedient— even ones that lower long-run prospects--to
maintain expenditures out of sheer necessity.  In contrast, sudden changes in
expectations about the future could occasion large changes in expenditure patterns
among the better off, even if the actual income changes were not large.
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Table 2: Fraction of Kecamatan in each area (province,
urban, rural) reporting “people selling assets to meet
basic needs” as a coping mechanism was “worse” (of
severity 1,2 or 3)
Total Urban Rural
DI Aceh 65.6 93.3 62.0
North Sumatra 49.2 68.6 43.8
West Sumatra 52.7 75.0 43.9
Riau 37.2 61.1 30.9
Jambi 32.2 53.9 25.5
South Sumatra 28.4 50.0 26.6
Bengkulu 25.8 57.1 16.7
Lampung 43.9 75.0 36.3
Average 41.9 66.8 35.7
Jakarta 88.4 88.4
West Java 83.2 87.5 82.5
Central Java 73.8 81.6 72.4
DI Yogya 65.4 84.2 59.0
East Jawa 76.7 86.0 75.4
Average 77.5 85.5 72.3
Bali 56.9 66.6 53.9
NTB 72.1 77.8 71.2
NTT 54.0 73.3 51.4
East Timor (Timtim) 40.3 46.2 38.7
West Kalimantan 33.6 100.0 26.7
Central Kalimantan 55.2 87.5 50.0
South Kalimantan 70.2 84.6 68.4
East Kalimantan 71.4 85.7 66.6
Average 56.7 77.7 53.4
North Sulawesi 28.0 35.3 26.4
Central Sulawesi 29.0 44.4 26.6
South Sulawesi 38.6 58.9 33.1
Southeast Sulawesi 51.6 55.5 51.0
Maluku 30.0 42.9 26.1
Average 35.4 47.4 32.6
Source:  Kecamatan Crisis Impact Survey,  Table 2
Kecamatan Crisis Impact Survey .  The kecamatan survey supports the finding that
urban areas have in general taken a harder hit than rural areas.  Comparing the 40
percent hardest hit provinces with the 40 percent least hit provinces reveals clearly
that urban areas are, on average, much harder hit than rural areas. Of the 20 hardest
hit areas, 14 are urban, while of the 20 least hit areas, 13 are rural.  Table 2 shows
the proportion of kecamatan in each provincial area reporting that the fraction of
people “selling assets to meet basic needs” was “worse.”  Within nearly every province
and each region or island this was consistently higher for urban than rural areas.  In
many cases the differences were dramatic, with only 17 percent in rural Bengkulu
reporting that, by this indicator, things were worse, versus 57 percent in urban areas,
or 33 percent “worse” in rural South Sulawesi versus 59 percent “worse” in urban
areas in the same province.
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This urban nature of the crisis makes eminent sense given the propagation of the
crisis through an exchange rate crisis driven collapse in the banking and financial
sectors affecting particular large corporations  which were heavily involved in external
borrowing.
C. Regional Dimensions
Looking nationwide, however, regional patterns reveal an even more complicated
picture; the kind of picture one would expect in a country as large and economically
diverse as Indonesia.  While urban areas are generally harder hit than their rural
neighbors in the same area, some rural areas have also been severely affected. Also,
some of the eastern provinces in both urban and rural areas have experienced
substantial negative impact. This distinct regional heterogeneity of crisis impacts with
some areas suffering enormously, other areas booming and several gradations in
between.
Kecamatan Crisis Impact Survey.  The kecamatan crisis impact survey is the only data
set that has national coverage.  Examining a set of tables and maps on the regional
distribution of the crisis suggests three prominent patterns.
• Java is hard hit, even in rural areas,
• Some of the other islands, particularly large parts of Sumatra, Sulawesi, and
Maluku, have experienced minimal negative crisis impact and areas that escaped
the drought may actually be booming from export crop earnings (due to the
currency depreciation);
• Other areas show negative impact, but it is unclear whether problems are
economic crisis-related or result from drought (East Timor, NTT, NTB) and fires
(East Kalimantan).
The kecamatan survey results place all areas of Java in the 20 hardest hit areas,
regardless of urban/rural status.  The only other rural areas included in the 20 most
affected areas are East Kalimantan and Aceh.  The urban areas that fall into the least
hard hit 40 percent are those in provinces where rural areas are also relatively
unaffected, such as Jambi, South Sumatra, Bali, North Sulawesi, Central Sulawesi,
Maluku, and Bengkulu.
One key indicator of impact in the kecamatan survey was the number of households
selling assets to cope with the crisis.  On the island of Sumatra 65 percent of rural
kecamatans reported that by this indicator conditions were the same or better than
last year.  That is, people were not resorting to asset sales to cope with the crisis. On
Sulawesi 70 percent of rural kecamatans reported things were the same or better.  In
contrast 72 percent of  rural kecamatans on Java reported on the basis of emergency
assets sales, that people were worse off, and 53 percent those in NTT, NTB and
Kalimantan also reported “worse.”  (See Table 2 above.)
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Figure 1 shows the map at the tingkat II level showing the distribution across the
country of a “coping” index which is based on indicators of the degree to which people
were selling assets to meet their basic needs, reducing their participation and
contributions to social activities, and other indicators of the use of  “coping”
mechanisms.  What emerges very strongly is a regional pattern in which Java is hard
hit.  Also on these maps the cities stand out as the kotamadya are small black dots.
100 villages.  Data from the 100 villages survey implies similar regional discrepancies
by comparing changes in assets form 1997 to 1998.  We constructed an index of asset
ownership based on 10 durable goods (e.g. radio, bicycle) weighted by the relative
prices of the goods.  It appears that there have not been massive sales of assets to
cover expenditures, but rather small increases in assets.  Moreover, the increase in
asset acquisition is increasing with largest increases in the western islands as
compared to Java, and the Eastern islands holding about even.  This is consistent
with the patterns above.
The expenditure data show a similar regional pattern (without deflation it is
impossible to say anything about levels).  Expenditures have increased more in the
parts of Sumatra in this sample (Riau and Lampung) than in either the villages
surveyed on Java Bali or the Eastern islands (note that all the islands in the sample
are those that are “hard hit” among the off Java islands in table 2).
Table 3:   A weighted asset ownership index: 1997, 1998 and Changes, and
nominal expenditure increases (undeflated).
Asset Index
1997 1998 Change
s
Percentage change in nominal
expenditures
Java-Bali 3.68 5.42 1.74 53.49%
Off Java
Islands –  West
4.27 9.42 5.15 89.38%
Off Java–  East 7.62 7.65 0.03 51.00%
Off Java-West: Riau, Lampung,
Off Java-East: East Nusa Tenggara (NTT), East Kalimantan, SE Sulawesi
Source: 100 villages survey, Table 13
While it is impossible to say precisely, there are obvious conjectures about the causes
behind the regional pattern of the crisis, depending on the origin of the crisis.
First,  since the crisis began as an exchange rate crisis with fed into a financial crisis
affecting primarily firms that had either some debts denominated in dollars or which
relied heavily on imports or firms which had links with the formal banking sectors.  It
makes sense that areas more closely tied up with the urban formal economy have
been harder hit that those areas which were not as tightly integrated.
Second, those areas which either had export crops or which were export earners
should be expected to do well, as the depreciation helped them enormously.  This,
combined with several reforms (e.g. clove marketing) that put more the benefit in the
hands of farmers should mean that some rural areas— that are not drought affected
and are not primarily rice producing (where, at least until August 1998 prices were
kept down) benefited enormously.
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Third,  some areas had natural disasters from which they have yet to fully recover.
The drought of 1997/98 was not as bad as had been feared on Java, but did hit the
Eastern Islands hard, as well as other scattered parts (west coast of Sumatra, parts of
Sulawesi).  In addition the drought interacted with the fires in East Kalimantan to
produce an eco-disaster.
One extremely important aspect of the crisis is that it does not appear to have hit the
poor areas disproportionately, but hit some well off areas hard and some poor areas
hard, and vice versa.  In fact, a simple correlation test between various indices and
pre-crisis levels of  the incidence of poverty based on SUSENAS 1993-1996 across
kecamatans reveals very little correlation, statistically insignificant even with 3,900
observations.
The same lack of association between pre-crisis poverty and the magnitude of the
crisis impact can be seen by comparing the figures which show changes (Figure 1,
showing the index of “coping”) due to the crisis to the pre-crisis poverty levels (Figure
2).  Table 4 gives examples of the various types.  While most of West Java, and
especially the area around Jakarta, have very low poverty rates, the crisis has been
enormous in those areas.  In contrast, Maluku, with very high poverty rates, has
perhaps even benefited from the crisis.
Table 4.  Examples of differential impact of crisis
Relatively well-off pre-crisis Relatively poor pre-crisis
Hard-Hit Jabotabek, West Java NTT, East Kalimantan
Not Hard Hit Central Sulawesi, Bali Maluku, Jambi
Source: Kecamatan Crisis Impact Survey, Table 3
The implications of all of this for policy are discussed in section E.
D. For Richer and Poorer
IFLS 2+.  In additional to the regional dimensions of the impact of the shock, the IFLS
2+ also gives some indication that even within provinces or within urban areas the
shock may not have hit the poor the worst, at least in proportionate terms.  While it is
true that the poor suffer more from a reduction in income because they are starting
with so much less, yet there are some indications that this crisis has hit individuals
who were better off harder in proportional terms.
Within those regions where the financial and corporate modern sector were hardest
hit, Jakarta and West Java, there is an interesting story emerging from preliminary
household data.  Average real per capita household expenditures fell by 30 percent in
Jakarta and 42 percent in West Java, which are truly terrifying falls.  In contrast
median expenditures fell by only one or two  percent in Jakarta and fell by six percent
in West Java.  In Central Java where average expenditures fell by 19  percent, median
expenditures has remained stable. This indicates that relatively richer households
have experienced the most significant declines in per capita household expenditure5.
                                          
5 This difference in the mean versus the median expenditure is a technical point about
statistics of central tendency in an asymmetric distribution but conveys an important
point and is worth explaining with a simple example.  Suppose there were an economy of
10 people, 9 of whom made one dollar and 1 of whom made 91 dollars.  Average income is
10 dollars even though 9 of 10 make much less and the typical or median income is only 1
dollar.  Now suppose the income of the rich person fell to 41 dollars, average income has
fallen in half to 5 dollars per person, but 9 out of ten people’s income is unchanged and
median income is still 1 dollar.
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This means that the regional pattern is mainly apparent in the mean, not the median
expenditures.  It is not the case that by the change in the median income Jakarta and
West Java are particularly hard hit, rather  then are  the typical.  Who was hit hard
then were those in Jakarta and West Java whose expenditures before the crisis were
well above the provincial average.
Table 5:  Household Per Capita Expenditures:  1997, 1998 & Changes
In real 1997 rupiah '000 per month
Province Mean Change in 1998 Percent Change
1997 Mean Median Mean Median
Jakarta 385 -115 -6 -29.9% -3.4%
West Java 366 -154 -10 -42.1% -5.9%
Central Java 234 -45 0 -19.2% 0.0%
S.  Kalimantan 217 -47 -27 -21.7% -17.2%
S Sumatra 187 -18 12 -9.6% 11.3%
North Sumatra 183 -18 -14 -9.8% -10.9%
NTB 173 -23 -7 -12.7% -6.5%
Source:  IFLS 2+, Table 2.3
The same tendency for the shock to have affected those that began better off is
evident in the data on change in expenditure level by education of the head of the
household shown in table 6.  Naturally the expenditure levels of those with higher
levels of education were higher in 1997.  However,  expenditures decreased 14 percent
in mean and rose 14 percent in median for those with no education.  In contrast,
median incomes for each of the other groups either rose slightly or fell, which mean
income fell by over 20 percent for each of the more educated groups.
Table 6:  Changes in mean and median per capita HH expenditures by
level of education of the head of HH.
Level of
Schooling
Mean HH monthly
expenditures per capita
(‘000 rupiah) in 1997
Percentage change
in the mean of
expenditures
Percentage
change in the
median of
expenditures
None 201 -14.43% 14.02%
Elementary 214 -26.64% -1.69%
Secondary 267 -29.59% -4.08%
Tertiary 357 -22.97% 1.66%
Source: IFLS2+, Table 2.5
This same effect is seen by examining the change in income of households to see to
what extent those in the bottom part of the distribution remained there.  Table 7
shows the distribution of expenditures per capita.  Those that were measured to be in
the bottom quartile of the expenditure distribution in 1997 saw an enormous increase
in their measured expenditures in 1998.  Similarly those in the top quartiles saw
enormous declines.  This likely reflects three factors.
The first is regression to the mean due to measurement error.  In even the best
surveys capturing per capita expenditures is a  tricky business.  Suppose incomes are
measured with a large amount of measurement error, then many of those in the top
are there merely due to measurement and would be expected to return with
subsequent measurement,  irrespective of what happened to their income.
The second is true transitory shocks to incomes and expenditures.  In addition to
measurement error, especially in turbulent economic times one would expect many
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large changes and reversal of fortune.  These “true” shocks would also tend to
produce regression to the mean.
The third, is that the shock actually affected those at the top end more than at the
bottom end of the distribution, as is suggested by the distribution of  education.
Table 7:  Changes in per capita expenditures, by initial
quartile of per capita expenditure (PCE)
Percentage changeQuartile in
1997
Per capita
expenditures
1997
In mean In median
I 50 120.0% 49.0%
II 105 41.9% 11.7%
III 190 -1.6% -18.8%
IV 680 -54.0% -41.4%
Source:  IFLS 2+, Table 2.6
What has happened to absolute poverty?  Absolute poverty depends on what happens
in the lower (left) tail of the income distribution.  Clearly, given the differences in the
mean and the median, merely assuming that the distribution of income changed in a
distributionally neutral way (as many of the poverty estimates have) is untenable.
Table 8 shows the results of poverty calculations of absolute poverty.  In order to
calculate the fraction of households that in 1998 were below the level of expenditures
that implied 11 percent poverty rate in 1997 one needs to deflate 1998 nominal
expenditures to 1997 “real” terms.  That is,  nominal expenditures rose a large
amount, but so did prices and hence there must be a deflation to “real” terms.  Given
the substantial price changes that happened this will be problematic, and,
unfortunately, which approach is pursued makes a large difference to the resulting
poverty rate.
The first two columns use the inflation rate by province calculated from the BPS
measurement of prices in 44 cities, and hence assume equal inflation in urban and
rural areas.  In the absence of rural-urban deflators from official sources this is
perhaps the most natural approach to deflation.
As can be seen by this approach “absolute poverty” has increased, from 11 percent to
13.8 percent of the population.  Since there have been widely cited numbers, not
based on new data, that poverty had increased to 39 percent (BPS) or even 48 percent
(ILO) of the population it goes without saying this number, which suggests a change
in poverty an order of magnitude smaller, will raise some controversy6.
However, before dismissing it out of hand,  this poverty calculation can be compared
with the expenditures data from the “100 villages” survey.  Using that data we pick
the 11th percentile of the 1997 expenditure data as the poverty line (in other words we
simply assume 11 percent poverty in 1997 for purposes of comparison, the 1997
                                          
6 Of course, it was known since their publication that these numbers were a massive
overstatement of the increase in poverty, as they were based on a huge analytical error in
their assumptions about how inflation affected poverty.  It is starkest in the ILO
publication, which assumed 80 percent inflation raised the poverty line by 80 percent, but
then assumed that nominal incomes were unchanged.  But since every transaction has a
buyer and a seller, each expenditure to one person is an income to another so the
assumption of 80 percent inflation with unchanged nominal expenditures is just
untenable.  In fact the data show that nominal expenditures did in fact increase
substantially (50-90 percent in table 3) and the only question is the appropriate deflation.
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number is arbitrary).  We then deflated 1998 expenditures by the national CPI and
calculated the fraction of the households under the 1997 poverty line.  By this
calculation poverty also only increased to 14.3 percent.
Also, while there were dire predictions made about the extent of poverty, other
estimates, that took into account the possible sectoral allocation of the fall in GDP,
were less dire.  For instance, in the World Bank’s Indonesia in Crisis the base case
predictions of the rise in poverty assumed zero growth in agriculture and hence that
most of the fall would be in the urban sectors (manufacturing, construction).  This
meant that the forecast was that poverty would rise only by 3 percentage points,
squarely in the range of 2.8 to 3.4 percentage point increases the actual new data
show7.
So the current findings, while dramatically different from some forecasts, are not in
fact unreasonable given the sectoral and regional composition of the contraction in
GDP.  They are not some fluke or massive flaw in the data, this is a finding that needs
to be taken seriously, but there are three issues that need to be taken into
consideration.
Table 8:  Poverty calculations using alternative assumptions
about inflation and different expenditure data
IFLS expenditure data
Deflation by province
specific CPI from BPS
IFLS deflation
1997 1998 1997 1998
All 11.0 13.8 11.0 19.9
Urban 9.2 12 9.2 15.8
Rural 12.4 15.2 12.4 23
None 19.1 19.4
Primary 13.6 15.5
Secondary 5.1 10.6
Tertiary 1.6 6.5
“100 villages” expenditure data
With BPS deflation IFLS
All 11.0 14.4 11 18.6
Source:  IFLS 2+, Table 2.1 and Table 2.3 and calculations from “100
villages” data.
First,  the BPS CPI inflation rate.  The IFLS survey also collected price information on
38 items.  Their inflation rate is 15 percentage points higher than BPS measured
inflation for the same provinces, and inflation was 5 percent higher in rural than
urban areas.  Obviously for fixed nominal expenditures each increase in inflation
lowers real incomes and hence will raise poverty.  So under the IFLS assumptions
about the inflation rate poverty rises from 11 to 19.9 percent.
However,  it would be no trivial matter to accept that the CPI— besides the exchange
rate— the most tracked macroeconomic indicator had misstated inflation by 15
percentage points in one year.  This would have implications for nearly every indicator
of economic performance.
                                          
7 In that report the baseline poverty rate in 1997 was 10.1 and the poverty rate was forecast
to increase in 1998 to 14.1 under the assumptions of a 12 percent fall in GDP
concentrated outside of agriculture.
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Second,  these calculations are not “true” poverty calculations as they deflate
expenditures and then compare with a previous poverty line.  If there had not been
massive changes in relative prices this would be appropriate.  However, the data show
that food prices have risen by more than non-food prices.  Since food prices play a
much more important role in the poverty line than in the CPI it is almost certain that
recalculating the poverty line (e.g. recalculating the level of expenditures necessary to
maintain a “minimal” nutritional intake) would raise the poverty line by much more
than the rate of inflation.
Third,  we return to the point that what is measure is expenditures, not incomes,
which has two important implications.  In the face of massive rises in the prices of
stables people will raise their expenditures to maintain their consumption, even at the
expense of reducing consumption on other items.  Hence they will be much worse off
than expenditures per capita would indicate.  Second, people will use “dissaving” to
smooth their consumption expenditures in the face of income reductions— especially
if those are perceived as temporary.
Both of these factors are illustrated by the dramatic changes in the composition of
expenditures.  Table 9 shows the changes in expenditure shares between 1997 and
1998 for the IFLS and the “100 villages” data sets.  Both show a large increase in the
share of expenditures devoted to food.  In fact, in the 100 villages data the shift is
almost unbelievably huge.  The IFLS data show that most of the shift has been in
“stables” with nearly everything else, including other food items, being reduced to
accommodate.
Table 9:  Changes in expenditures shares, 1997 to 1998
IFLS 100 Villages
1997 1998 Change 1997 1998 Change
Food 70.0 74.0 4.0 66.2 75.7 9.5
Of which:
Stapes 23.6 31.7 8.1
Meat 12.7 10.0 -2.7
Dairy 3.1 3.1 0.0
Oil 2.4 2.7 0.2
Vegetables 10.5 11.1 0.6
Non-Food 30.0 26.0 -4.0 33.8 24.3 -9.5
Of which:
Alcohol/tobacco 4.3 4.7 0.4
Health 1.4 1.0 -0.4
Education 3.5 2.9 -0.5
HH goods 5.6 4.7 -0.9
Transport 2.4 2.2 -0.2
Clothing 2.5 1.9 -0.6
Housing 8.2 6.6 -1.5
Recreation 2.2 1.9 -0.3
Source:  IFLS 2+ , Table 3.1 and “100 villages” data.
In evaluating these figures on expenditures shares, keep in mind the earlier
mentioned temporary spike in the price of rice.  This would cause a temporary spike
in the share of stables that my not reflect a long-term trend as the prices declined
rapidly in October.
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However, of particular concern is that expenditure shares on health and education
are being reduced, which combined with the reductions in  income imply  reductions
in absolute amounts being spent on these items.
E. Implications of the new data
There are two important questions, should these new findings be trusted?  And
second, what does this distribution of the shock across individuals mean for poverty
rates and the social impact of the crisis?
We don’t really know all we would like to know, and certainly it would be rash to
make important decisions based only on new quantitative data, but decisions will be
made and there is a need to act on what information we do have.  How does the
existing data square with available anecdotal accounts?
First, the heterogeneity of the crisis suggests that there has been a substantial fall in
average or typical income, but that is perhaps even more striking is that there has
been a huge amount of “churning” or changes in who is or is not doing well.  There is
an analogy with recent labor market studies that emphasize that changes in
aggregates often mask huge underlying volatility amongst individuals.  For instance,
in industrial countries when the unemployment rate increases by one percentage
point, from 5 to 6 percent this is not because 1 percent of the people lost their jobs.  It
is because the differences in the gross flows, which are normally very large, changed
so that say, of the normal number of people losing jobs increased from 11 percent to
12 percent and the number of people finding jobs stayed steady at 11 percent.  But
the gross job creation and destruction is often orders of magnitude larger than the
changes in the net.
So to in an economic crisis.  Even though on average expenditures might not have
changed much this is a combination of some people, which may have doing quite well
prior to the crisis having done really badly while others staying about the same while
still others are booming.  This level of individual “churning” in well being cannot be
ignored as an important part of the perceptions of the crisis as it creates uncertainty
in everyone’s mind in a way that structural poverty does not.
Second,  the vast expansion in new reports in the media and through other channels
on poverty and suffering need to take into account the very changed political
circumstances.  Whereas before government officials had no incentive to report on
poverty, and in fact were likely encouraged to understate poverty, the existence of
safety net program financing reverses those incentives.  In addition, the media were
not free in the previous regime and may have been directly or indirectly discouraged
from reporting on negative features, like the homeless.  In this case increased
reporting on poverty is a new freedom on reporting.
Third,  given the regional heterogeneity of the crisis what one reports depends on
where one reports from.  This crisis is consistent with village level studies that report
either complete devastation (in villages dependent for employment on a particular
factory) or a boom (in villages that are export crop oriented).  There is a huge crisis in
Jakarta, which is the capital city and hence reports from there will tend to reflect the
serious and deep crisis there.  But anecdotal reports cannot be extrapolated to a
general or national picture.
Fourth, these reports are consistent with many anecdotal reports from different
regions.  Visitors to some parts of Indonesia have been reporting since the beginning
of the crisis that in some areas there were few problems.  So while about areas like
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Jakarta one hears many crisis stories there are also anecdotal reports of rural areas
in which local motorcycle dealerships are booming.
Moreover, a recent qualitative study in parts of Central Java by a team of sociologists
studying the issue qualitatively report that the crisis is not in fact affecting the poor
as severely as was feared.  In fact, this report suggests the crisis may even be helping
them in some ways, as middle class consumers return to traditional markets
(dominated by informal sellers) from more formal retail channels and return informal
services (such as repair) that would have been avoided.
Turning a question as important as reliability,  what are the implications for policy?
• the data suggest that geographic targeting is a very important part of response to
the crisis.  If the country were hit equally across all regions then perhaps a
universal response would be appropriate.  However,  it is clear some areas are (at
least relatively) booming.
• disproportional impact on those who were doing well before the crisis means that
there in general terms little correlation between the pre-crisis poor and near poor,
ad the social impacts of the crisis.  People who begin from different absolute levels
of income will have different responses to the crisis.  For instance, middle class
families will respond to a shock by working more, reducing consumption, drawing
down savings, and selling assets, but are unlikely to pull children from primary
school or suffer malnutrition.  In contrast, people near absolute poverty may not
have the luxury of these coping strategies so an equally large shock will force them
into more drastic measures, such as primary school drop-out and reduced food
intake.
• the lack of correlation between those suffering from the crisis at every level (urban
versus rural, across provinces, and across individuals) raises important and
difficult questions in program design whether one is targeting to poverty or is
targeting to crisis suffering.
• The type of programmatic response needs to be sensitive to the origin of the shock
in a particular locality.  Therefore, if the cause is a draught and the impact is
affecting peasant farmers food for work programs are a possibly appropriate
response. However, if the crisis is that former urban bank clerks with a high
school education or higher are unemployed due to a banking crisis, it is not clear
that relief type programs will be effective.
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III. EMPLOYMENT
A. Forecast
In early October, 1998 the Manpower Minister stated that one in five Indonesian’s was
currently unemployed and that this would rise to 20 million people (22 percent of the
workforce) by the end of the year.8  However, these type of forecasts, as well as earlier
unemployment numbers of 15 percent were extrapolated from simple
GDP/employment elasticity models and not from real data.
These unemployment figures clearly do not hold up under analytical scrutiny.  For
one, relationships between output growth and employment developed as the economy
grows are a poor indicator of what will happen to employment when output drops.
Employment/output “elasticities” focus on the demand for labor, but say little about
supply.
In fact, it is unlikely there will be widespread "unemployment" when wages are flexible
downwards and households do not have sufficient savings or safety net support.  That
is,  the effect one would expect to see from a contraction in labor demand in an
economy like Indonesia is not “structural unemployment” of the type seen in Europe,
but rather falls in real wages and increases in employment rates and labor hours as
families try and maintain their real necessary expenditures. The absolutely poor
cannot afford to be “unemployed.”
The data bear this out.  What is happening is an increase of the fraction of the labor
force employed and little or no rise in open unemployment.  What is happening is that
household members are working more, and perhaps longer hours, working for lower
wages, and there has been a massive shifts in the sectoral composition of employment
growth with formal sectors like construction, manufacturing and finance contracting
while informal sectors (self-employment, trade) are expanding.
B. New Unemployment and Employment data
The shortcomings of the Ministry's unemployment projections were elaborated in a
June 1998 ILO report which put forward its own lower unemployment estimates. The
report, "Employment Challenges of the Indonesia Economic Crisis", explained that
"because many cannot afford  to remain unemployed for long, around half of the
workers displaced by the crisis will be absorbed in the informal sector."  (p. 28)  The
study estimates that open unemployment would rise from 5 percent in mid-1997 (pre-
crisis) to 7 percent in mid-1998.  And that the problem will be one mainly of educated
job seekers in the towns and cities.  ILO's lower estimates are closer to findings of the
new data sources.
SUSENAS.  Initial results of the SUSENAS survey conducted in February 1998 show
that employment increased in February 1998 by 4.5 million from a year earlier -- with
almost all the new jobs in agriculture.  Applying the GDP/employment elasticity
model -- correlating unemployment to reduced output would instead suggest reduced
employment of 11.5 million!   These same SUSENAS data show that open
unemployment rose from 5.1 percent in February 1997 to 6.4 percent in February
1998, as compared to 15.1 percent projected by the model.   Impact of the crisis on
participation in the labor market is shown in Table 10 where the first rows show data
                                          
8 The Indonesia Observer, Oct. 9, 1998
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from SUSENAS in Feb 1998 shows total employment rates among the population aged
ten and above rising 1 percent, from 56 to 57 percent of the population.
Table 10:  Employment rates of the population aged 10
and above
1994 1997 1998 Change, ’97 to 98
Total 57.6 56.3 57.4 1.1
Urban 50.4 50.5 52.2 1.7
Rural 61.5 59.4 60.2 0.8
Source : SUSENAS
100 villages.  The data from the 100 village study show employment rates of the labor
force and employment rates in non-agricultural activities and an indicator of open
unemployment.  Open unemployment in this sample is recorded at 1.6 percent of the
population, the main informational value of which is that this indicator is a
completely worthless indicator of the state of the labor market.
The labor force participation of the population aged 10 and above has fallen by less
than a percentage point (-.7).  This is a combination of a fall in employment of men
and a slight rise for women.
Table 11:  Employment and unemployment rates  by gender
1997 1998 Change
Open unemployment
Total 1.5 1.6 0.0
Employed (bekerja)
Total 57.5 56.9 -0.7
Males 74.2 72.4 -1.8
Females 40.5 40.8 0.3
Work more than 35 hours
Total 49.4 56.9 7.5
Males 58.8 64.5 5.8
Females 31.9 42.9 11.0
Source:  100 villages survey, various tables.
What is perhaps somewhat more surprising is that those reporting working more than
35 hours a week has also increased, by a considerable amount.
IFLS 2+.  The IFLS2+ has slightly different data on employment in that it breaks This
data indicates that participation in the labor force (measured as those that earned
income in the previous year) for both males and females at younger age (15-24) has
increased substantially. On the other hand, older men and women have experienced a
significant decline in labor market participation.
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Table 12:  Labor force participation (earned income in the year)
Age group 1997 1998 Change
1997 to 1998
Males
15-24 35.3 41.2 5.9
25-34 89.5 88.6 -0.9
35-44 96.3 91.8 -4.5
45-54 93.4 89.4 -4
55-64 83.6 73.8 -9.8
65+ 61.3 56.8 -4.5
Females
15-24 21.9 25.4 3.5
25-34 39.1 38.6 -0.5
35-44 46.8 48.9 2.1
45-54 45.2 45.5 0.3
55-64 36.4 35.7 -0.7
65+ 28.3 26.9 -1.4
Source:  IFLS 2+, Table 4.1
C. Sectoral and Regional Shifts in Employment
SUSENAS.  The new data from the census show huge shifts in the composition of
employment between rural and urban, and between “formal” and “informal” sectors.
For instance,  employment in industry fell 13 percent, in Finance 7.3 percent, in
electricity 27 percent, in construction 2.6 percent.  However,  some of these sectors
are relatively small parts of the labor force.  So for instance,  although employment in
finance declined 7.3 percent, since it was only .7 percent of the labor force this only
reduced jobs in that sector by .1 percent of the total labor force.  Agriculture more
than expanded to pick up the slack.
Table 13:  Sectoral composition of the labor force,  comparing February 1997
with
February 1998
1997 1998
Sector: Number
(‘000)
Percent Number
(‘000)
Percent
Percentage
change
Change are
percent of 1997
labor force
Agriculture 36711.7 44.5% 42279.1 48.6% 15.2% 6.8%
Mining 737.8 0.9% 805.1 0.9% 9.1% 0.1%
Industry 9418.4 11.4% 8191.2 9.4% -13.0% -1.5%
Electricity 348.6 0.4% 254.1 0.3% -27.1% -0.1%
Constructio
n
3963.4 4.8% 3606.5 4.1% -9.0% -0.4%
Trade 14613.5 17.7% 15032 17.3% 2.9% 0.5%
Transport 3835.1 4.6% 3734.6 4.3% -2.6% -0.1%
Finance 696 0.8% 645.2 0.7% -7.3% -0.1%
Services 12153.7 14.7% 12449.9 14.3% 2.4% 0.4%
82478.2 100.0% 86997.7 100.0% 5.5% 5.5%
Source:  SUSENAS, Table 2a
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In terms of the “formality” of the employment there is no explicit data.  But table 14
shows the distribution of employment  by category.  It shows that employment as
“employees” declined by roughly 2 percent of the labor force  and that what caused
the increase in the labor force was “self-employed” workers in urban and rural areas
and an increase in “family” workers in rural areas.  This is reflects the sectoral shift
above.
Table 14:  Distribution of the labor force by type of employment
Urban Rural
Share of
1997
labor
force
Percentag
e growth
Growth
as % of
labor
force
Share of
1997
labor
force
Percentag
e growth
Growth
as % of
labor
force
Self-employed
(Berusaha sendiri) 6.6% 25.5% 1.7% 13.3% 25.4% 3.4%
Self-employed with
workers
(Berusaha dibantu
buruh)
5.3% -13.1% -0.7% 20.0% 4.6% 0.9%
Employer/Employee
(Buruh/Karyawan)
18.8% -4.9% -0.9% 16.6% -6.0% -1.0%
Unpaid family workers
(Pekerja tak dibayar)
2.7% -2.3% -0.1% 16.7% 13.1% 2.2%
Total 33.4% 0.0% 0.0% 66.6% 8.2% 5.5%
Source: SUSENAS
D. Wages, Real and Otherwise
Individual survey variables in the Kecamatan Crisis Impact Survey show an increase
in nominal wages.  More than 85% of the mantri tani reported that wages had
increased for hoeing.  Responses also indicate that there has been a less dramatic
increase in harvesting wages9. These imply that while assumption of no change in
nominal income are far off the mark10, given of the data about price changes suggest
there have been substantial real wages declines in many areas. However, on the
revenue side, there has been an intermediate increase in non-rice output prices.
Mantri tani responses also point to some increase in farm profitability (more than 50%
answered that farm profits had increased compared to last year, although the mean
response was no change), indicating that increases in output prices have outweighed
rising labor costs in some areas.
The one set of data that do not jibe with this story (either in terms of regional patterns
or the magnitude of the shock) are the rural wage data.  BPS collects data on
agricultural wages, which many people suspect for a variety of reasons (e.g. small
samples, reports on “typical” wages no actual).  These data show large falls in real
wages for unskilled agricultural wages.  National CPI inflation has been 81 percent
between December and August.  This would imply real wage losses between 30 and
40 percent in most provinces.  This is certainly appears inconsistent with the
                                          
9 Data from BPS indicate that agricultural wages have increased 30-35% on average for
different tasks, with increases ranging from 10 to 50% in different provinces.
10 One recent publication for instance, placed the numbers in poverty in Indonesia at
nearing 100 million in 1998, which essentially assumed that nominal incomes would
remain unchanged while prices climbed 80 percent.  This is obviously both analytically
unsound and empirically false.
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evolution of expenditures, especially among HH headed by an unskilled worker,  but
perhaps the expenditure data are reflecting more HH members working and higher
work hours.
The regional pattern does no seem to be consistent with either the Kecamatan or IFLS
data, with smaller wage increases in East Java for instance, than in parts of
Sumatera and Sulawesi.
Table 15:  Daily nominal wages in various agricultural tasks
(hoeing, weeding, planting),  December and August 1998.
% change Dec-97 Aug-98
Avg. of 3 agricultural tasks
West Sumatra 21.08% 3091 3742
West Java 21.25% 3517 4264
Central Java 21.36% 2370 2876
South
Kalimantan
24.31% 4044 5028
Lampung 24.59% 2256 2811
South Sumatra 26.16% 2404 3033
DI Yogya 26.91% 1333 1691
North Sumatra 29.89% 3349 4350
South Sulawesi 29.93% 2597 3374
East Java 32.80% 3428 4553
NTB 35.23% 3004 4062
Bali 38.71% 3940 5465
DI Aceh 54.47% 3021 4666
North  Sulawesi 61.11% 4703 7577
Source: BPS, various publications
E. Implications for Employment Creation Program Design
In an economy like Indonesia “unemployment” is not the right lens to see the problem
with collapsing labor demand, rather the focus should be on real wages, particularly
the wage for unskilled labor and on total earnings of households.
Imagine two types of economies, one with perfectly fixed wages and one with perfectly
flexible wages.  In the economy with fixed wages a collapse in labor demand will mean
workers will be laid off and will be unable to bid down the wage and hence will want
to work at the going wage, but will be unable to do so.  In this sense “unemployment”
is a disequilibrium phenomena.  In this case the brunt of unemployment will fall on
those that are laid off.  Many workers will continue to work at the same wage as ever
while the earnings of those with no job will be zero so the suffering is born exclusively
by those particular individuals who are unemployed.  In this case the policy response
to identify those individuals and raise their incomes.
In contrast in a market with flexible labor markets (e.g. few hiring and firing
restrictions) and flexible wages (particularly real wages in an inflationary period)
“unemployment” is not the problem but falling wages will be.  That is, laid off workers
will be able to bid down the wages of other workers such that everyone who wants to
work at the going wage will be able to find employment.  But,  it may well be that the
wage falls to very low levels.  Especially in such an economy with little or no social
security, large scale “unemployment” is just not feasible, people must work to survive
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and the informal market absorbs the additional labor shed from the formal sector, but
at lower and lower earnings.
And that is what the emerging data say.  Employment rates, the proportion of the
population in the paid labor force, are up.  Unemployment rates are up only slightly.
But this is not necessarily a good sign as working more is a coping mechanism as
households are having more people work longer hours for less pay as a way of
maintaining their incomes.  The issue is sustaining the earnings of the poorest, not
preventing lay-offs or providing “unemployment” insurance.
This implies that employment creation programs need not be targeted to specific
individuals (as all are bearing the costs of reduced wages) but should be targeted to
areas with depressed demand for labor.
Furthermore,  this suggests that it is not desirable or possible to target employment
programs based on data about “unemployment.”
IV. EDUCATION
A. Forecast
There were also widely repeated forecast was that enrollment rate of school aged
children would fall from 78 to 54 percent.  This implies that one of five school aged
children would with drop-out of school.
Now while this was often repeated as fact or a reliable forecast, the estimate was given
as a guess of one official of what might happen if the crisis were severe and if nothing
were done.  Fortunately in this case something was done, the Bank and ADB
supported a government launched a nationwide “Stay in School” campaign with an
information program, scholarships to poor children in junior secondary school, and
grants to schools to make up for lost revenue.  What exact impact those programs
had is hard to say, but it is clear that enrollment has not in fact fallen by anywhere
near the amount feared.
There have been falls in enrollment, but nothing like the feared 24 percentage points,
more like 4-5 percentage points.  But this is no cause for complacency as any reversal
in the schooling of children is a potentially irreversible waste that cannot be
condoned.  Moreover, the experience with the previous macroeconomic crisis was that
the losses in enrollments began in the years after the crisis.
B. Primary versus secondary
In addition to the three sources above there is also a recent survey of schools
themselves, tracking enrollments in schools over the last four or five years.
Kecamatan Crisis Impact Survey:  The kecamatan survey asked only abut primary
school.  Nearly all respondents indicated that taking children out of primary school
was not a common response to crisis impacts.11  This result is further reinforced by
the responses given by the school supervisors to the sector specific questions –
almost 85% indicated that there had been no change or a reduction in the number of
                                          
11 The common question did not differentiate between primary or secondary school students.
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students that dropped out between Grade 3 and 4.12  On average, school supervisors
also indicated no change in the overall level of dropouts during the last school year
(compared to the preceding year) or in the numbers of girls and boys that entered
Grade 1 this school year (compared to last year).
However, for the latter there is some indication that in some areas there is a decrease
in first-year enrollment rates, indicating that parents may be delaying school starts
for younger children while letting older children continue.
100 Villages data.  Table 16 shows the enrollment rates for ages 7-12 and 13-15 from
the 100 villages data comparing 1994, 1997 and 1998.  Strangely,  the data indicate
that there has been a substantial increase in the school enrollment rates of primary
school aged children for both boys and girls.
Table 16:  Enrollment rates  at primary (7-12) and secondary (13-15)
school ages
Changes (percentage
points)
Age group Gender 1994 1997 1998
1997 to
1998
94 to '98
Males 88.8 88.8 92.1 3.2 3.3Ages 7-12
Females 90.4 90.8 93.3 2.5 2.9
Males 59.4 67.5 65.2 -2.3 5.8Age 13-15
Females 58.4 70.6 65.2 -5.4 6.8
Source:  100 villages data, Table 06.A and Table 06.B
However, when we look at the 13-15 age group in the 100 villages data, school
enrollment between 1997/98 and 1998/99 school years decreased by 3.3 percentage
points in the 100 villages, with the fall substantially larger for girls than for boys.
Interestingly, this still leaves enrollment rates in 1998 well above their levels in 1994.
IFLS 2+ data.  The IFLS 2+ data has slightly different age breakdowns.  They show do
not break down into primary and secondary enrollment rates but divide children 7-12
year olds (essentially primary and lower secondary) and from youth and young adults
13-19 year olds (junior, upper secondary and beyond).  For children enrollment rates
declined by 1.1 percentage for boys and 2.8 percentage points for girls (but note that
the absolute level is now equal for boys and girls).  This suggests larger changes at
this level than found in either the 100 villages (which suggested increases) or school
survey below (which suggests no crisis induced change).
                                          
12 Historically, dropout rates at the primary level are highest between these two grades.
There was no difference in responses for girls or boys.  Other data sources indicate the
problem with drop out is at the junior secondary level and hence our data has little to
contribute on this issue.
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Table 17:  Changes in enrollment rates  by age groups and
male-female
1997 1998 Change
(percentage points)
Males 94.9 93.8 -1.1Aged 7-12
Females 96.6 93.8 -2.8
Males 61.6 56.8 -4.8Aged 13-19
Females 59.4 55.7 -3.7
Source: IFLS2+, Table 5.1 and Table 5.2
The IFLS 2+ shows dramatic decreases in enrollments among youth and young
adults.  Enrollment rates dropped by 4.8 percentage points for males and 3.7
percentage points for females.
Educational survey.  An additional source on education enrollment comes from a
recently completely survey of schools, which examined the enrollments for 600
schools for the past five enrollment years. This data compares enrollment changes
across years, with a focus on the most recent  change from 1997/98 to 1998/99
school year where one would expect the “crisis impact”.
Figure 3: Percentage change in the number of students enrolled
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Overall enrollments at the primary level fell by 1.5 percent in 1998/99 (“crisis impact”
year), but do not appear to be deviating from their past trend (Figure 3).  Enrollments
fell by similar, or even larger amounts in each of the three previous school years.
Keep in mind that decreases in enrollments by school are consistent with rising
enrollment rates of school aged children if either age cohorts are smaller due to falling
population growth rates or with additional school construction.
There is some indication of increasing late enrollment at the primary level that
suggests trouble down the road.
Overall at the junior secondary level there has been a decline in the number of
students enrolled in the crisis year by 2.3 percent.  This, is in contrast with primary
school, is a much larger decrease than in previous years.  However, it is a little
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puzzling that the “change in the change” that is the decrease in the rates of growth
precedes the crisis and that there was a decline of 1.2 percent the year before the
crisis.
Summary:  Primary versus Secondary.  All of the data sources are consistent that the
fall in enrollments is much larger at the secondary level than at the primary level.  In
fact, there appears to be either no decrease or a slight increase in enrollment rates at
the primary level.  There is a note of concern about increasing late enrollment of
children, but difficult to assess the magnitude of that problem.
But,  it has always been well known that the major problem with enrollment rates in
Indonesia is the sharp fall off in enrollments as children, especially poor children, do
not make the transition from primary to lower secondary school.  In this sense it is
not surprising that the observed response to the crisis is drop-outs at the junior
secondary and higher, not the primary level.
C. Rural versus Urban and Regional Pattern
The various data sources are spotty in their coverage of rural-urban and regions.  We
focus first on the rural versus urban breakdown from the educational survey and
then piece together information on the geographic distribution from the 100 villages
and Kecamatan crisis impact survey.
Education survey data: Rural versus urban.  The education survey gives the best
information on the urban rural breakdown of changes in enrollment.  There is no
clear pattern in the data for primary schools.  But for junior secondary schools there
are two clear patterns, one which is quite puzzling.
First,  there have been substantial reductions in enrollments in urban junior
secondary schools.  Moreover, as can be seen from table 18 enrollments fell in urban
areas about six percent in the crisis year.  Moreover, the crisis is even more evident in
Jakarta than elsewhere, with junior secondary enrollments falling 8.6 percent (Table
20).
Of course, since this is school based (not household) data the declines in urban areas
and relative stability in rural areas could be driven either by declines in urban
populations of children or households migrate back to rural areas or by declines in
enrollment rates among school aged children in urban areas.
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Figure 4: Percentage change in the number of students enrolled in
rural and urban areas
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Second,  and this is puzzling part,  the decreases in the growth rate of enrollments
seems to have happened the year before  the crisis.  That is, while enrollments grew in
rural areas at 4.5 percent from school year 95/96 to 96/97 this was already a
decrease in growth from the previous year of 5.6 percent growth.  What is very
puzzling is that while in the crisis year enrollment rates fell 6.2 percent, they also fell
6.2 percent in the previous year.  Moreover, the growth rate declined by more (3.4 and
3.5 percentage points) in the two previous years than in the most recent, crisis year.
Table 18:  Changes in enrollments in sampled junior secondary schools, by rural,
urban and Jakarta
Rural Urban
(incl. Jakarta)
Jakarta
Growth in
Enrollment
(percent)
Change
in growth
in
enrollme
nt
Growth in
Enrollment
(percent)
Change
in growth
in
enrollme
nt
Growth in
Enrollment
(percent)
Change
in growth
in
enrollme
nt
1994/95  to
1995/96
5.6 0.7 -0.8
1995/96  to
1996/97
4.5 -1.1 -2.7 -3.4 -4.5 -3.7
1996/97  to
1997/98
1 -3.5 -6.2 -3.5 -5.1 -0.6
1997/98  to
1998/99*
-0.6 -1.6 -6.2 0 -8.6 -3.5
Source : Education Survey
IFLS 2+ data.  The IFLS 2+ data has similar patterns. Enrollment rates for youth and
young adults 13-19 year olds (junior, upper secondary and beyond) dropped by 5
percentage points in urban areas, while it is only declined by 1.1 percentage for rural.
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Table 19:  Changes in enrollment children 13-19 years by
rural and urban
1997 1998 Change
Urban 66.9 61.9 -5.0
Rural 53.9 52.9 -1.1
Source: IFLS2+, Table 5.2
Regional Patterns
Education Survey data. The data from the educational survey can be broken down
into provinces and rural/urban regions, but doing so produces quite small samples of
schools and hence the results need to be taken with a great deal of caution.
Nevertheless, the provincial and urban/rural desegregation suggests a common
pattern, that some areas are doing relatively well (e.g. rural areas of South Sulawesi,
rural Maluku) while others, particularly urban areas like Jakarta are doing badly.
Table 20:  Data from education survey by region and
rural urban
Rural Urban
South Sulawesi Number of Schools 12 10
96/97 to 97/98 -1.5 -7.7
97/98 to 98/99 8.1 -3.4
Maluku Number of Schools 11 8
96/97 to 97/98 -1.6 -0.1
97/98 to 98/99 -0.7 -5.7
North Sumatra Number of Schools 13 11
96/97 to 97/98 0.9 -7.7
97/98 to 98/99 -2.4 -2.3
Central Java Number of Schools 15 9
96/97 to 97/98 2.1 -7.5
97/98 to 98/99 -0.4 -6
Jakarta Number of Schools 32
96/97 to 97/98 -5.1
97/98 to 98/99 -8.6
Source: Education Survey
100 villages.  The 100 villages data only divides into the three regions, but
nevertheless it is interesting to see that the major falls in enrollment rates in the 13-
15 age group are happening in Java-Bali, then the “eastern” part, with a very small
decrease recorded in the “western” islands.
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Table 21:  Enrollment rates of children aged 13-15, by
region
1994 1997 1998 Change
1997-1998
Change
1994-1998
Java-Bali 53.44 65.93 59.55 -6.38 6.11
Off J-B-West 58.64 68.79 67.99 -0.8 9.35
Off J-B-East 67.13 73.24 70.9 -2.34 3.77
Off Java-West: Riau, Lampung,
Off Java-East: East Nusa Tenggara (NTT), East Kalimantan, SE
Sulawesi
Source:  100 village survey
Kecamatan Crisis Impact Survey.  The map in Figure  5shows the distribution of the
index of the severity of primary school drop-out across regions across
kabupaten/kotamadya.  Remember that on average drop out at the primary level in
this survey was typically not a very severe problem so the variation across the
categories between most and least hit is perhaps not as severe.  Nevertheless, the
distribution does appear consistent with the other regional data sets are showing.
Areas (especially rural) areas in South Sulawesi, Sumatra (except for North) and
Maluku are doing relatively well while the Eastern Islands,  North Sumatra, and parts
of Java (especially Central and West) and the cities are faring badly.
D. New data :  Rich versus Poor
IFLS 2+.  The IFLS is the only source that can show a relationship between the level of
household expenditures and the change in the enrollment rates.  The household
enrollment rates are shown by their 1997 (pre-crisis) level of household per capita
expenditures.  For children aged 7-12 the data shows an 4.9 percentage point fall in
enrollment for bottom quartile compared to no change or slight decreases for other
expenditure groups.
For youths and young adults the results are different, in that the fall in percentage
points is nearly the same for the bottom two quartile groups, 5.1 and 5.5 percentage
points with much smaller falls for the higher quartiles.  The percentage fall does
follow in the income pattern closely.
Table 22:  Change in enrollment rates by income group
Children
Ages 7-12
Youths and Young Adults,.
Ages 13-19
Change 97 to 98
Quartile by
HH per
capita
expenditures
in 1997
1997 1998
Change
97 to 98
1997 1998 Percentag
e point
%
change
I 93.1 88.2 -4.9 51.5 46.4 -5.1 -9.9%
II 96.3 96.8 0.5 64 58.5 -5.5 -8.6%
III 97 95 -2 62.1 61.1 -1 -1.6%
IV 98.4 98.4 0 66.9 64.6 -2.3 -3.4%
Source:  IFLS 2+, Tables 5.1. and Table 5.2.
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Reconciling these results suggesting that the falls in enrollments were the lowest
amongst the rich with the results above that the greatest proportional losses in
income came from the higher groups raises two important points about interpreting
various indicators of the crisis.
First, particularly for indicators that are discrete (e.g. enrolled or not enrolled in
school, eat two meals or more than two meals) there may be absolute thresholds.
Suppose all families with income greater than a certain, quite low, level eat three
meals a day while those below eat three meals a day.  Then even a large shock to the
rich will not show itself in an indicator that relies on eating a certain number of meals
as they will absorb relatively large declines in their incomes before ceasing to eat
three meals a day.  Similarly with schooling, the rich will absorb large income losses
and cope through other mechanisms before undertaking a desperate and irreversible
action like withdrawing their children from school.  In contrast, many of the poor may
already be near the threshold and hence even a moderate shock may push them over
the edge13.
This means that one cannot use an indicator such as a change in enrollment as a
proxy for the general impact of the crisis as it will depend both on the magnitude of
the shock and the pre-existing level of income.
The second point is slightly more subtle, and has to do with the possibility of
asymmetric responses to shocks and the impact of changes versus “churning.”  That
is, suppose that enrollment and drop-out decisions are more or less irreversible.
Furthermore, suppose that the drop-out decision is influenced by current income (in
addition to lifetime income and future expectations).  Now suppose that some
households income increases while other households income decreases, but with no
change in average income.  It still will be the case that this churning will produce
declines in enrollments, as the 16 year old who dropped out two years ago when his
family was poorer is less likely to reenroll in school due to a positive income shock
than the 16 year old is likely to drop-out when his family faces a negative shock.  This
asymmetry will mean that increased levels of churning of household income can lead
to large changes in some indicators (like enrollments) even if the average or typical
income does not change.
E. Implications for Response Program Design
The relatively small, and regionally concentrated, declines in enrollments are
consistent with the varied nature of the crisis.  Clearly if the shock fell primarily on
the rich then one would not expect falls in primary or even lower secondary
enrollments as even large falls in income would not bring these households to a
threshold of withdrawing their children from school.
Hopefully at least some small part of the smaller magnitude of these declines than
what was forecast is also a reflection of the success of the Bank/ADB "stay in school"
campaign, even though the actual scholarships had not in many cases been
disbursed by the time this data was collected.  However, there is no evidence yet on
program impact.
                                          
13 This is obvious in a technical sense from any non-linear model predicting a binary
outcome (such as probit or logit regressions).  The marginal impact of a given change
depends not only on the magnitude of the change but also on where in the distribution
function the change is evaluated.
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The emerging data suggest that the strategy pursued so  of scholarships and block
grants is likely the right strategy.  The fact that the losses are the largest amongst the
poor and at the junior secondary and secondary school levels, suggesting that a
strengthening of the campaign to retain students in school through targeted
scholarships can be effective.  However, the targeting of the program is a major issue,
as it currently is targeted based on essentially “pre-crisis” poverty information (as that
was all that was available) but needs to be sure it is also reaching new crisis areas
like poorer sections of hard hit urban areas.
V. Health and nutrition
Summarizing health and nutrition status is complex as there are a variety of different
indicators of health (self reported morbidity, visits the medical practioners, reports on
specific disease conditions, etc.) and of nutrition (weight for age, birth weight,
deficiencies in specific nutrients, etc.) and we do not have space to do it justice here.
At this stage we will make only two observations.  First, that a collection of health and
nutrition indicators from the IFLS 2+ and from SUSENAS ’98 show how complex it
will be to investigate impacts.  Overall these data are not inconsistent with the
evidence above of a complex and heterogeneous crisis, with pockets of serious health
impacts.  Second, there is clear evidence of a cutback in visitation rates to public
clinics, but how exactly the interpret that is far from clear.
Indicators of health and nutrition
Table 23. derive from the IFLS 2+ data, shows a mix of indicators with a variety of
patterns.  Overall there are some indicators that show improvement, others that show
worsening,  but overall the changes are small in either direction.
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Table 23:  Variety of indicators of health and nutritional status
1997 1998 Change
Nutrition
Height for age
(% of children under 9 with z score <-
2)
50.68 45.66 -5.02
(improvement)
Weight for height
(% of children under 9 with z score <-
1)
35.56 35.20 -0.36
(improvement)
Body mass index of adults
(% of population with kg/meter
squared<18)
14.05 14.69 0.63
(worsening)
Inadequate Hemoglobin
(percent with level less than 12 mg/dl)
34.75 30.83 -1.66
(improvement)
Evaluated health status
Number of seconds to move from
sitting to standing 5 times
7.6 5.9 -1.64
(improvement)
Overall evaluation of health status by
nurse
5.94 5.98 0.04
(slight improvement)
Self reported health status
% reporting themselves in poor health:
adults
13.64 13.83 0.19
(slight worsening)
% reporting their children in poor
health
6.96 8.3 1.34
(worsening)
0
% reporting that they had been ill 21.01 21.95 0.92
(slight worsening)
% reporting their children had been ill 25.56 24.76 -0.8
(slight improvement)
Source: IFLS2+, Table 6.7
The data from the 1998 SUSENAS (collected relatively early in the crisis) shows some
changes in self-reported morbidity.
Table 24:  Self reported morbidity in SUSENAS
Morbidity Disruptive MorbiditySource of
Income: 1995 1998 Change 1995 1998 Change
Indonesia 25.4 25.5 .1 9.6 10.6 1.0
Financial
services
21.9 25.1 3.2 6.4 9.2 2.8
Constructio
n
24.8 26.5 1.7 9.5 11.2 1.7
The other data sources, such as the “100 villages” and other specific nutritional data
show similar complex patterns, with some indicators improving and others worsening.
Given the complex and regionally heterogeneous nature of the crisis itself, this is not
surprising.
One additional point the data agree on is that usage of public clinics has declined.  In
the IFLS 2+ data the usage of publicly run health services declined by 1.8 percentage
points among adults and by a huge 7.1 percentage points among children.  SUSENAS
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data comparing 1998 with 1995 (not 1997) show similar declines concentrated among
public services.  The concentration among public services raises the question as to
whether these declines are driven by falling incomes and reduced ability to pay (in
which case one would  perhaps expect to see declines in the private services and a
shift to public services).  An alternative is that the budget cuts affected the perceived
quality of the public clinics almost immediately (e.g. reduced inventories of drugs) or a
pass through in public clinics of costs and hence the decline in demand is due to
these factors specific to the public sector.
Table 25:  Use of health services, particularly public health
services
1997 1998 Change
% of Adults using any services 14.4 13.3 -1.1
% of Adults using any public services 7.2 5.4 -1.8
% of children using any services 25.8 19.9 -5.9
% of children using public services 20.3 13.2 -7.1
SUSENAS data on contact rates in the population
1995 1998 Change
Total 14.6 12.1 -2.5
Private 7.0 6.5 -0.5
Public 7.6 5.6 -2.0
of which:  Health centers 6.4 4.5 -1.8
VI. Conclusion
Many reports on the crisis in Indonesia suggest that the impact has been universal
and devastating, severely affecting  rural and urban, poor and rich, modern and
traditional sectors, and almost every region.  The BPS has reported that the
percentage of people living below the poverty line in mid-1998 was around 40 percent
or about 80 million people: an increase in the poverty rate of almost 30 percentage
points in a year. In early October, 1998 the Manpower Minister stated that one in five
Indonesian’s was currently unemployed and that this would rise to 20 million people
(22 percent of the workforce) by the end of the year.14 There were also widely repeated
forecast was that enrollment rate of school aged children would fall from 78 to 54
percent.  This implies that one of five school aged children would with drop-out of
school. Those reports have motivated of new survey to assess the impact of the crisis
on many faces of the Indonesian economy.
Preliminary findings suggest that, indeed, the Indonesian crisis has affected the life of
many Indonesians.  There is no doubt one of the most serious crisis that Indonesia
has faced in 30 years.  However, the impact has been very heterogeneous and has
been less dramatic than early predictions suggested.  While many households are
enduring difficult shocks, other are benefiting.   Particularly,  each of the numbers
cited above are off, by roughly an order of magnitude.
The finding has potential implications in the allocation of resources, and the need for
regular monitoring efforts for better targeting.
Designing specific programs that respond to the crisis is complicated and must
balance several objectives, but this data at least suggest that crisis response efforts
should target those areas with the relatively largest drops in welfare levels
                                          
14 The Indonesia Observer, Oct. 9, 1998
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It is important to note that the magnitude of crisis impacts does not correlate with
pre-crisis levels of poverty.  This result points to the need to reassess data and
assumptions about poverty distributions.  While difficult to draw in practice, there is
a analytical distinction between targeting for the critical targeting long term poverty
programs.  In designing longer term poverty interventions there is a deeper, and
resolved, question of whether the crisis has changed fundamental dynamics and
hence calls for a rethinking of long-term poverty programs or is merely a temporary
shock.
In terms of the kinds of interventions that should be designed for the crisis this
requires more detailed analysis of the cost-effectiveness in practice of various types of
interventions.  But there appears a need for continued efforts to channel rice and
other basic foods to needy areas, workfare programs, especially in urban areas, efforts
to maintain health services, and continuation of the scholarship program.
